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Kant s kingdom of ends: metaphysical, not political using barcode drawer for none control to generate, create none image in none applications.barcode generator and reader in c# looks like or what exact none for none ly it consists in; the formulation simply posits rational nature as the only possible unconditional end of an unconditionally valid practical law. I shall return to this point below. More important now is the way in which the limited practical warrant just pro ered modi es the ontological status of Kant s claim: while the existence of rational nature as an end-in-itself is a practically necessary presupposition of a rational will s acting in accordance with the categorical imperative, rational nature may have no existential status independently of the rational will s taking FUL as its unconditional practical law, with FHE as that law s unconditional substantive end.

18 On the above analysis, the derivations of the basic formulation of the categorical imperative (FUL) and its rst two variants (FULN and FHE) draw on substantive metaphysical presuppositions concerning the nature of a rational will and the substantive ends of its willing. FUL casts the will as a power to act independently of the causality of nature; FULN introduces the thought of the systemic e cacy of law-governed pure rational willing; and FHE posits the existence of a non-sensible, rational nature as the end to be e ected through law-governed willing. In no case is the argument relativized to the human condition; FUL, FULN and FHE are all conceived as applying to practically rational beings in general.

Yet the ontological status of the conception of the will as non-sensibly e cacious power and that of rational nature as its non-sensible end are relativized to the realm of practical as opposed to that of theoretical reason. Turning nally to FKE, recall the contention that although it results in combination with the above principles , this third variant of the categorical imperative is nonetheless non-derivative, requiring a special act of [practical] cognition . What does this special act consist in As mentioned, FKE sets itself apart both from the basic formulation and from the rst two variants in not being articulated in the form of a single second-order principle.

Indeed, in contrast to both FULN and FHE, both of which are derived from the basic formulation directly, FKE is derived not from FUL itself but from FULN in conjunction with FHE. Kant speaks of FKE as representing a whole of all ends in systematic connection in accordance with the above principles (G IV 433), where the reference to ends invokes FHE and that to systematic connection FULN. Interpretation is further complicated by the interpolation of what commentators sometimes designate as the additional formula of.

iPhone OS For a fuller discussion of the nature of such practical as opposed to theoretical warrant see Flikschuh, Kant s Indemonstrable Postulate , 8 13.. katrin ikschuh autonomy (FA) between t he rst two variants and the third. FA represents the principle of every rational being as one who must regard himself as making universal law by all the maxims of his will, and must seek to judge himself and his actions from this point of view . It is this principle which leads to the very fruitful concept of a kingdom of ends (G IV 433).

It looks, then, as though FKE is derived from FULN and FHE through the interpolation of FA. Under FA the will takes FULN as the objective rule and FHE as the subjective end of its legislation (G IV 431). Only through giving its maxims the form of a possible universal law of (non-sensible) nature, treating in so doing rational nature as an end-in-itself, is the will not merely subject to the law but subject to it in such a way that it must be viewed as giving law to itself (G IV 431).

Self-legislation consists in the will s giving its maxims the form of universal law under the idea of a subjectively adopted end which, being based on no interest , is therefore unconditional (G IV 432). We may say that self-legislation is selfsubjection under a universal law whose unconditional end the will adopts as its own through the act of giving its maxims the form of universal law. Here, I want to return to my earlier remark regarding the indeterminate speci cation of rational nature as an end-in-itself.

The idea of the selflegislating will s taking rational nature as the end of its law-making should not be interpreted as the will s regarding its particular rational nature or its particular rational capacities as the end of its moral lawgiving. We should not specify rational nature in each person as referring to each person s individually distinct rational self or capacities, construing the self-legislating will as one that legislates universal law on its behalf. To the contrary, FA demands that each rational will give its maxims the form of universal law so as to treat rational nature in general as an end-in-itself.

It is this idea of the autonomous will as legislating law to itself on behalf of rational nature in general that gives rise to the very fruitful concept of a kingdom of ends . On the interpretation here suggested, a self-legislating will can arrive at the idea of a kingdom of ends independently of (the willing of) all other rational beings. Yet no rational will, in legislating the moral law to itself, does so on its behalf.

This reading of the kingdom of ends formulation con icts with currently dominant interpretations of it as a normatively co-legislated realm whose purpose is the mutual fostering of one another s capacity for personal autonomy. I shall try to show that the proposed reading better ts Kant s direct argument for FKE as well as the Maximenethik of the Groundwork more generally..

Kant s kingdom of ends: none none metaphysical, not political 4 the kingdom of ends as metaphysical ideal: self-legislation on behalf of rational nature in general. Kant s immediate argumen t for the kingdom of ends formulation begins with the characterization of the concept of a kingdom in general as representing a systematic union of di erent rational beings through common laws (G IV 433). This ts Kant s general conception of a political union.19 However, a kingdom of ends constitutes the special case of a union of rational wills through ethical laws; it represents the ideal of an ethical union that arises when each rational will, in legislating the moral law to itself, abstracts from all personal circumstances and ends (G IV 433):.

For rational beings all none for none stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as a means but always at the same time as end in himself. But from this there arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, that is, a kingdom, which can be called a kingdom of ends (admittedly only an Ideal) because what these laws have as their purpose is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means..

This speci cation of FKE as a systematic union of rational wills through common laws in which we abstract from personal ends but not from the end-setting capacity of each20 has given rise to its interpretation as an ideal ethico-political order, established through a deliberate act of co-legislation, the purpose of which is the reciprocal fostering of one another s personal end-setting capacity. According to Korsgaard, to join with others as citizens in the Kingdom of Ends is to extend to our inner attitudes and personal choices the kind of reciprocity that characterizes our outer actions in the political state .21 Korsgaard goes on to say that I must make your ends and reasons mine, and I must choose mine in such a way that they can be yours.

But this just is reciprocity. Generalized to the Kingdom of Ends, my own ends must be possible objects of a universal legislation, subject to the vote of all. And this is how I realize my autonomy.

22 This is a politicized reading of an ethical ideal. Kant does not speak of individuals as joining the kingdom of ends, nor does he characterize rational beings as citizens of such a kingdom. There is no mention of a reciprocal exchange of inner attitudes, and no requirement that the.

19 20 21. Cf. MdS VI 313: A state (civitas) is a union of a multitude of human beings under laws of Right. If we did abstract from the end-setting capacity of each, we would be abstracting from the capacity of the will to act from maxims.

But a will that cannot act from maxims cannot prescribe FUL to itself. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends , p. 192.

22 Ibid. p. 193.

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